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Marta Lachowska and Michał Myck
What Is the Relation 
between Public Pensions 
and Private Savings?
Pension systems where current 
pension benefi ts are fi nanced by current 
revenues, also known as pay-as-you-go 
systems, are vulnerable to demographic 
changes such as increased longevity and 
declining fertility. In part because of 
lower birth rates in the United States, a 
2014 Social Security Board of Trustees 
report projects that by 2033, the costs of 
Social Security programs will increase 
so that revenues will pay for only about 
77 percent of scheduled benefi ts (U.S. 
Government Printing Offi ce 2014). 
To deal with such demographic 
changes, over the past 20 years many 
European countries, including Italy, 
Poland, Sweden, and Germany, have 
reformed their pension systems (see, 
for example, Szczepański and Turner 
[2014]). A common theme of pension 
reforms has been to change the design 
of future pensions in order to encourage 
people to work longer and save more 
for retirement. Such reforms provide 
an opportunity to estimate whether, in 
response to lower future pensions, people 
save more on their own, or, equivalently, 
to answer whether pay-as-you-go public 
pensions crowd out private saving. The 
public pension crowd-out is an important 
policy parameter, because it tells us how 
much people would save on their own if 
Social Security benefi ts were lowered. 
The 1999 Pension Reform
To answer whether public pensions 
crowd out private saving, in a recent 
Upjohn Institute working paper, 
Lachowska and Myck (2015) study 
Poland’s 1999 pension reform, which 
created a setting similar to a “quasi-
experiment.” The reform lowered future 
pension benefi ts but had a different 
impact on individuals, depending on their 
year of birth. Individuals who were older 
than 50 at the time of the reform were not 
directly affected. However, those who 
were between 30 and 50 years old at the 
time of the reform will receive pension 
benefi ts computed according to a less 
generous postreform pension formula. 
Figure 1 shows the median 
replacement rate, defi ned as the ratio of 
the fi rst pension benefi t of the head of 
household to his or her last preretirement 
salary, before and after the reform for the 
cohorts affected and unaffected by the 
reform. Prior to the reform, many could 
expect a replacement rate of about 60 
percent. After the reform, the replacement 
rate for the cohorts unaffected directly by 
the reform remained the same; however, 
the replacement rate for the cohorts 
affected by the reform fell by about 20 
percentage points. We use the arbitrarily 
set cutoff at age 50 to identify whether 
this drop in pension generosity led to an 
increase in the private saving rate. 
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Figure 1  Median Replacement Rate Before and After the Pension Reform
We want to stress that this quasi-
experimental variation is valuable 
because a person’s future pension 
benefi ts depend on one’s earnings, and 
the determinants of earnings are in 
turn likely to be correlated with how 
much one saves. Hence, because of  
unaccounted-for confounding factors that 
affect both earnings and savings, simply 
comparing the savings of somebody 
with a high future pension to the savings 
of somebody with a low future pension 
may not isolate the effect of pension 
on saving. However, by comparing the 
saving rate before and after the reform 
and across similarly aged people—some 
of whom were affected by the reform 
and some of whom were not—we can 
identify the effect of the change in 
pension generosity on the saving rate. 
Methods
To estimate the responsiveness of 
private savings to pensions, we use 
data from the Polish Household Budget 
Surveys for years 1997–2003. We begin 
by estimating multiyear “difference-
in-differences” regressions comparing 
household saving before and after the 
1999 reform for the cohorts affected 
and unaffected by the reform. These 
comparisons tell us how much the 
saving rate changed because of the 
reform. In a second step, we estimate 
the change in PLN (Poland’s currency) 
of the private saving rate for a change 
of 1 PLN in pension wealth—that is, the 
public pension crowd-out. To do this, 
we compute what the pension wealth 
would have been under the prereform 
and postreform legislation and relate this 
variable to saving. As before, we use 
the fact that the 1999 pension reform 
changed the amount that similarly aged 
people could expect to receive in public 
pensions. 
Figure 2 shows the point estimates 
from a multiyear difference-in-
differences regression using the saving 
rate as the dependent variable. The point 
estimates show the difference in the 
saving rate of the households affected 
by the reform relative to the saving 
rate of households unaffected by the 
reform and relative to year 1998—the 
year preceding the pension reform. In 
order to interpret the point estimates 
as effects of the reform on the saving 
rate, we should not see any statistically 
signifi cant differences in the rate between 
the households affected or unaffected 
by the reform in the years preceding 
the reform. If we do, we would worry 
about preexisting group and time trends 
in saving rates that would confound the 
estimated effect of the reform. However, 
in the years following the reform, we 
expect to see an increase in the saving 
rate of the households whose expected 
pensions were reduced by the reform. 
We see from Figure 2 that in 1997, 
relative to the unaffected households 
and relative to the year 1998, there was 
no statistical difference in the saving 
rate of the cohorts later affected by the 
reform. That the saving rate in 1997 is 
not different for the cohorts affected 
and unaffected by the 1999 reform 
strengthens our claim that differences 
in the saving rate between the cohorts 
observed after 1999 really are an effect 
of the reform. The saving rate tends to 
increase over time in the years following 
the reform for the cohorts whose pensions 
were reduced relative to the cohorts 
who were unaffected by the reform and 
relative to the prereform saving rate. 
This suggests an effect of the reform in 
the expected direction. The magnitude of 
the estimated effects on the saving rate 
in Figure 2 is between 0 and less than 
5 percentage points, which is a large 
increase, given that the average saving 
rate in our data is about 2 percent and the 
median saving rate is about 9 percent. 
Key Findings
How does the change in the saving 
rate reported in Figure 2 relate to the 
degree of public pension crowd-out? 
In our working paper (Lachowska and 
Myck 2015), we report the following key 
fi ndings: 
 Our analysis shows that public 
pension crowds out private saving by 
about 0.24 PLN for each 1 PLN. 
 For older cohorts (born between 
1949 and 1953), middle-aged cohorts 
(born between 1954 and 1968), and 
people with a higher education, we fi nd a 
large and statistically signifi cant crowd-









Unaffected by the reform Affected by the reform
Before the reform After the reform
NOTE: Replacement rate is defi ned as the ratio of fi rst gross pension benefi t to last gross salary of 
the head of the household. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD 1998 and 1999.
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implies that, for these groups, private 
saving and pensions are close to perfect 
substitutes. 
 Younger cohorts (born after 1968) 
and lower-educated households display 
much smaller public pension crowd-out. 
Policy Implications
A crowd-out of 0.24 suggests that 
public pensions displace a sizable 
part—about one-quarter—of private 
savings. However, compared to other 
recent studies, our estimate of crowd-
out is at the lower end of the range of 
existing estimates.1 Also, our subsample 
analysis reveals that this crowd-out is 
not uniformly distributed in society, but 
rather is concentrated among certain 
types of households. If the goal of 
pension reforms is to increase private 
saving, policymakers should be aware of 
the heterogeneity in the responsiveness 
of saving to pension reforms. Simply put, 
some households might increase their 
saving in response to benefi t cuts, while 
other households might not save enough. 
We speculate that the nonresponse 
among the younger households could be 
due to liquidity constraints, incomplete 
information, or uncertainty about how 
enduring the 1999 reform would be. 
For young people, building up a stock 
of wealth might simply be a question 
of time, and as they age they may 
accumulate more saving. However, the 
lack of a savings response observed 
for the less-educated households is 
worrisome and echoes the fi ndings of the 
fi nancial literacy literature. The concern 
is that by remaining passive and not 
adjusting their saving, these households 
are at risk of having a low standard 
of living in retirement. One policy 
conclusion from the passive behavior 
of the low-educated households is that 
all households do not behave according 
to the predictions of the classical 
life-cycle model; therefore, limited 
fi nancial literacy should be taken into 
consideration when designing pension 
reforms. 
Note
1. For example, Attanasio and Brugiavini 
(2003) report a range of effects between 0.30 
and 0.70; Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) 
report the crowd-out to be between 0.65 
and 0.75; and Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula 
(2006) estimate it to be 0.70.
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NOTE: The fi gure shows point estimates from a multiyear difference-in-differences regression of 
saving rate on an indicator for whether the household is affected by the reform, i.e., whether the 
household is “treated,” six-year dummies, and an interaction term between the year dummies and 
the “treated” dummy. The fi gure presents the interaction point estimates over time. The omitted 
categories are year 1998 (the year just before the reform) and the cohort born 1937–1948 (the 
cohort unaffected directly by the reform). The regression uses robust standard errors clustered 
by year of birth, and the fi gure presents 95 percent confi dence intervals. The dashed vertical line 
indicates the fi rst year of the reform.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD.











19981997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
